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RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER TO
THE CORPORATE DIVIDEND
HUGH G. IsLEY*
The difficulties and complexities of the problem confront-
ing a court which is called upon by the minority share-
holder of a corporation to invoke its equitable power to
"force" the corporate dividend can be readily appreciated.
Accordingly, a survey of the decisions on the subject reveals
that the courts, motivated either by a realization of these
difficulties or restrained by a recognition of their own in-
competency to overrule the decisions of the corporate direc-
tors, have chosen a policy of great reluctance to interfere
with the directors failure to declare the corporate dividend.
In spite of this reluctance there have been instances in
which the courts have felt that an exercise of their equitable
power was justified, the general rule being that the granting
of dividends from the profits of a corporation is in the
discretion of the directors subject to the interference of a
court of equity for improper refusal.1 Thus, it has been
held that invocation of the equitable power was justified
where the directors, in refusing to declare the dividend,
were guilty of "fraud or abuse of discretion,"2 or where
their refusal was arbitrary and unreasonable,3 or where
they were withholding distribution by reason of adverse
interest or bad faith.4 It is generally held, however, that
actual fraud on the part of the directors need not be shown,
and that equity may compel the dividend in the case of such
arbitrary or wrongful withholding of dividends as to con-
stitute a breach of trust,5 or where the dividend policy is
* 2d year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1951
' For general discussion of this rule, see annotations at 55 A.L.R. 8,
76 A.L.R. 885, 109 A.L.R. 1381.
2 Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 809 (1936).
' Harry Chanon v. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920).
1 Stevens v. U.S. Steel, 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 905 (1905); Tefft v.
Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837 (1925); Murray V. Beattie Mfg.
Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 322, 82 Atl. 1038 (1912).
55 A.L.R. 51.
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dominated by the personal interests of the directors rather
than the corporate welfare.6
Admittedly, the benefit to be derived from the preceding
judicial propositions is negligible when considered apart
from the factual circumstances which brought the parties
into court; hence it would seem that only through an anal-
ysis of these circumstances and the judicial considerations
based thereon can meaning or semblance of order be drawn
from the decisions. A study of the cases reveals that the
decisions have turned on a number of considerations, which,
for the purposes of analysis, may be divided into two cate-
gories: (1) those considerations relating to the needs of the
particular corporation; and (2) those dealing with the
status of the particular shareholder or shareholders seeking
relief.
The basic consideration of the first group, as evidenced
by the decisions, is the justification of the directorial reten-
tion of dividends in the light of the working or expansion
capital needs of the corporation involved. This is as it
should be, for if the refusal to declare a dividend can be
justified on the basis of sound business policy, the court
should not interfere. It is obvious, however, that no rule
of thumb can be devised which will satisfactorily determine
the amount of working capital which should be retained in
a given business or the extent to which entrepreneurial
expansion of the business should be carried. The needs
vary greatly with the type of business; and even among
businesses of the same type, there may be-due to differ-
ences in policy-great variations in the need for capital. It
is perhaps with a realization of these complexities that the
courts have been hesitant to interfere with directorial dis-
cretion and to compel a dividend merely on the basis of the
existence of a large surplus.7 Thus, the courts have held
that abnormal withholding of dividends was justified where
the nature of the business was likely to require a great deal
o Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947).
Trimble v. American Sugar Refining Company, 61 N.J. 340, 48 At.
912 (1901).
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of working capital,8 or where the directors were justified in
retaining dividends for use as expansion capital.9
In Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co.10 the court in
denying relief to the shareholders cautioned the directors:
"A court of equity is not without control over a cor-
poration where the directors roll their profits into
their business year after year until the great snow-
ball has been magnified twenty diameters."
Accordingly, the dividend has been compelled where profits
amounting to ten times the capital of the corporation had
beep. accumulated;" where no dividend had been paid by the
defendant national bank for five years even though the period
was marked by a considerable accumulation of profits ;12 and
where there was no intent on the part of the directors to
utilize the accumulated profits for proper re-investment. 13
The second category of considerations, i.e., those dealing
with the status of the shareholder seeking relief presents a
more difficult, a less tangible problem; for the courts' main
consideration must, in theory at least, lie with the needs of
the corporation. The problem, however, is brought sharply
into focus by the case of the non-cumulative, non-participat-
ing preferred shareholder; for to him a dividend once passed
is gone forever and seldom reflects itself by an increase in
the value of his holdings. While it is beyond the scope of this
8 Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N.W. 550 (1924).
D corporation was in the real estate business. But of. Leviton v. N. J.
Holding Co., 106 N. J. Eq. 517, 151 Atl. 389 (1930) which held that
defendant-realty company could not plow corporate profits back into
the business indefinitely, even though there were opportunities for
profitable re-investment.
R laynolds v. Diamond Paper Mills Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941
(1905).
10 Ibid.
' Crichtbn v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904). But cf.
Hopkins v. Union Canvas Co., 104 Pa. Super. Ct. 264, 158 Atl. 301 (1932.)
in which a similarly high ratio existed, but relief was denied on the
grounds that the corporation "needed" expansion capital.
Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y.S. 860 (1894).
Supra, note 3. An interesting point relative to what constitutes a
proper purpose for re-investment of corporate profits was raised in the
leading case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668
(1919), in which a decree compelling the dividends of $19,000,000 was
upheld on the grounds that the directors' intention to utilize the accum-
ulated profits to reduce prices for the benefit of the public was not in
line with the main purpose of the business-the benefit of the share-
holders.
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treatment to consider the peculiar problems relating to the
preferred shareholder's rights to the undeclared dividend,
it should be noted that courts have looked with sympathy at
his sometimes disadvantageous status and have strived to
compel a dividend in his favor.1 4
A problem which is closely related to that of the non-
cumulative preferred shareholder is that presented by the
life.tenant shareholder who, for obvious reasons, is greatly
interested in forcing the dividend before his interest expires.
An additional complication is introduced into the picture
when the directors of the corporation are the remaindermen
of the interest held by the life tenant. In such a situation,
it is evident that the adverse interest of the directors can
foster a dividend policy most unfavorable to the life tenant;
and the courts have not been blind to such a possibility.'
Thus, it has been judicially recognized that a plaintiff life
tenant is entitled to hold the director-remaindermen to great-
er accountability of profits than a mere shareholder.1 6
A factor which is pertinent to the considerations here in-
volved and one for which there is slight judicial authority is
that recognized in Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co. 17
The court there distinguished between stock for which there
was a ready market, and that of a closed corporation, the
market for which is greatly limited. The owner of readily
saleable stock can realize the acumulated profits in the form
of the increased value of his holdings, while the stockholder
in the closed corporation is forced to rely for the most part
on the declaration of dividends. In view of the fact that the
great majority of cases in which relief has been granted
involved stock which was not readily marketable, it would
seem that such a consideration plays no small part in the
decisions of the courts.
The last factor concerning the shareholders' status, which
has seemingly affected the decisions, is the past relationship
1, See, Note, Compe~ling Declaration of Dividends by Contract Con.
struction, 39 Ir..L.REv. 90 (1944).
15 Ochs v. Maydole Hammer Co., 138 Misc. 665, 246 N.Y.S. 539 (1930);
Murray v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 79 N.3.Eq. 322, 82 AtI. 1038, 1045 (1912).
16 Ochs v. Maydole Hammer Co., supra note 15.
7 Supra, note 9.
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of the shareholder to the dividend policy. If the complaining
shareholder has participated without objection in the receipt
of dividends and has acquiesced in the accumulation of a
large surplus, it has been held that he cannot later demand
distribution of that surplus.18 Similarly, it has been held
that if the complaining shareholder as a former director
helped inaugurate a dividend policy, he will not later be
heard to complain of the unfairness of that policy.' 9 It is
submitted, however, that such holdings are questionable
as to their general acceptability for it would not seem that
a shareholder's approval of a dividend policy today should
preclude his attacking its reasonableness or fairness tomor-
row in the light of ever-changing business conditions.
While the preceding two categories of considerations offer
some help in a preliminary analysis of the problem, they
offer little aid in reconciling the decisions. A closer analysis
of the decisions granting relief to the minority stockholders
reveals that the main concern of the courts lies with con-
siderations which fail to fit neatly into either of the cate-
gories; but rather cuts across both and, in the last analysis,
seem to provide the basis for the conclusion that relief should
be granted. This third group of considerations encompasses
those instances in which there exists a relationship of con-
flicting interest between director and stockholder, resulting
in a dividend policy fostered by the self-interest of the direc-
tors. For example, in Crichton v. Webb, 20 the directors
were withholding profits for the purpose of paying off
corporate debts incurred in self-dealing contracts. Sim-
ilarly, in Hiscock v. Lacy,21 there was evidence that no divi-
dend had been declared in order to "freeze out" the minor-
ity and to pay excessive salaries to the majority shareholder
group. Accordingly, relief has been granted where the
majority of the directors combined to restrain dividends
to keep a third director from getting his proportionate
i Marks v. American Brewing Co., 126 La. 666, 52 So. 983 (1910).
20 Supra, note 2.
Supra, note 11.
Supra, note 12.
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share of profits, 22 and where there was fraudulent collusion
between the directors and a bankrupt shareholder in an
effort to prevent the latter's trustee from obtaining divi-
dends.23  Relief has also been forthcoming when the with-
holding of dividends was accompanied by an increase of
salaries, unreasonable commissions, and excessive expense
accounts for the majority group.2 4
The recent case of Whittemore vs. Continental Mills"
involved a somewhat novel variation relating to conflicting
interests between stockholder and director. It was alleged
by the minority group that the directors were influenced
by the majority stockholders to restrain dividends to avoid
high-bracket income taxes. The plaintiff-stockholders fur-
ther argued that continuation of such a policy might sub-
ject the corporation to a penalty under Section 102 of the
Internal Revenue Code.20 The court granted relief.
The stockholder life tenant, director-remainderman prob-
lem touched on previously is pertinent here; for the
adverse interest between stockholder and director is no
small factor in the decisions of such cases.27 Similarly,
agreements by director-shareholders of closed corporations
providing that the stock of a deceased director shall become
the property of the survivors on payment to the estate of
an agreed sum raise a problem of adverse interest. In
" Laurel Springs Land Co. v. Fougeray, 50 N.J.Eq. 756, 26 Atl. 886
(1893); Lawton v. Bedell, 71 Atl. 490 (N.J.Ch. 1908).
' In re Brantman, 244 Fed. 102 (2d Cir., 1917).
24 Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y.S. 204
(1930); Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939).
98 P.Supp. 387 (D.Me. 1951).
, § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides for a surtax
on improperly accumulated corporate profits presents an interesting
analogy to the problem here. T. D. 4914, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 108,
prescribed certain tests to determine whether the necessary Intent
to evade taxes was present. Indications of insufficient distribution of
profits were: failure to distribute 70% or more of earnings; invest.
ment in securities or other property unrelated to normal business activ-
ities; and loans made to shareholders or corporate officers. These con-
siderations are not far removed from those involved in the Immediate
problem. See, Cannon v. Wiscassett Mills Company, 195 N.C. 119, 141
S.E. 344 (1928), in which the defendant corporation had invested Its
accumulated profits in low return securities.
"I Bupra, note 15.
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such agreements it is often provided that during the period
of payment, the stock is to be held by the estate as security
for the amount due, and dividends therefrom-or a portion
thereof-are to be paid to the estate. In the presence of
such adverse interests between the beneficial shareholder
and the corporate directors, the dividend has been com-
pelled.28 Thus, there is much to be said for the proposition
that while courts pay lip service to an examination of the
capital requirements of the corporation in question or to
the status of the particular shareholder, the adverse interest
of the directors is often the keystone in the granting of
equitable relief.
The previous discussion has been chiefly concerned with
the problem involved, stripped of the alterations brought
about either by charter provision or statutory modification.
On close analysis, it would seem that very few cases actually
turn on the presence of a statute or by-law provision; for
in the last analysis the decision to pay dividends must lie
within the discretion of the directors, and only in the event
of what the court considers to be an abuse of that discre-
tion will the equitable power to compel the dividend be
invoked.
There is authority, however, to the effect that corporate
by-law provisions offer grounds for relief where it would
otherwise be unavailable. Thus, where the by-law contained
a maximum figure for earned surplus and provided that on
attaining that figure, dividends must be paid out of current
earnings, it was held that the by-law was valid and could
not be overridden by resolution of the directors to retain
profits in the company. 9  Also by-laws making divi-
dends mandatory when capital-would not be impaired there-
by, have been invoked as a basis for affording relief.8 0 The
21 Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App.Div. 176, 164 N.Y.S. 1033
(1917).
-9 Lydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Grove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482
(1939).
0 Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1944).
But f. Koppel v. Middle State Petroleum Corp., 197 Misc. 479, 96 N.Y.S.
2d 38 (1950), in which the court denied relief in the face of similar pro-
visions on the grounds that it was within the discretion of the directors
to set up contingency reserves which absorbed the profits which would
have been paid out as dividends under the provision.
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case of Leviton v. Nortk Jersey Holding Company1 presents
an interesting point in this respect. It was held there
that a by-law expressly providing for re-investment of
profits in real estate did not give the directors a right of
perpetual re-investment. Thus, the courts seem prone to
construe the by-law so as to impose only a reasonable re-
striction on the shareholders' right to demand a dividend,
on one hand, and a reasonable restraint on the discretion
of directors to withhold dividends on the other. It is open
to question, however, whether such by-law provisions are
the deciding factor; for it would seem that in most cases
a similar decision would have been reached absent the by-
law provision.
Statutes governing the shareholders' rights to the cor-
porate dividend fall into two categories: (1) those which
codify the common law and leave the dividend policy within
the discretion of directors ;82 and (2) those which make man-
datory a declaration of dividends from earnings that are not
reserved for working capital by the directors or stock-
holders. 83 It should be noted that statutes of the first class,
while generally providing that the dividend decision is
within the discretion of the directors, have been construed
by the courts to require a "good faith" discretion.84 There-
fore, it would seem that these statutes effect little change in
the common law.
The second type of statute, which has been adopted by
New Mexico and North Carolina, presents an interesting
problem. The statutes in the two states are almost identical,
both apparently stemming from an 1896 New Jersey statute
which has since been replaced in New Jersey by one of the
first category.85 Section 55-115 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes provides:
31 Supra, note 8.
0 N.J.REV.STAT. 1937, 14:8-20; VERNox's TEx.STAT. 1936, Art. 1329;
UTAH CODE A- No., 1943, 18-2-16 (4).
3 N.S.GEN.STAT. 1950, § 55-115; N.M.STAT. 1941, § 54-316.
3' Agnew v. American Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 66 A.2d 330 (1949).
A discussion of the early New Jersey statute appears in Stevens v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 68 N.J.Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 905 (1905).
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"The directors of every corporation created under
this chapter shall, in January of each year, unless
some specified time for that purpose is fixed in the
charter, or by-laws, and in that case at the time so
fixed, after reserving, over and above its capital
stock paid in, as a working capital for the corpora-
tion, whatever sum has been fixed by the stock-
holders, declare a dividend among its stockholders
of the whole of its accumulated profits exceeding
the amount reserved, and pay it to the stockholders
on demand. The corporation may, in its certificate
of incorporation or by-laws, give the directors the
power to fix the amount to be reserved as working
capital."
A superficial analysis would seem to indicate that the stat-
ute has provided the stockholders with an effective weapon
to combat the autonymous powers of the directors. A more
realistic approach, however, premised with the realization
that in the great majority of cases in which relief is sought
the directors either own controlling interests themselves or
control the stockholder vote, reveals that the statute adds
little-if anything-to the minority stockholders' common
law rights. Compliance with the statute may be had by
the reservation of working capital through a resolution of
the stockholders; this usually presents little problem for the
directors, who more often than not, control the ballot. A re-
view of North Carolina cases reveals, however, that the court
has relied upon the statute to grant relief when the reserva-
tion of working capital left unreserved profits in the cor-
porate till."6 The cases imply that once the working capital
has been reserved, the directors are under a legal duty to
distribute the remaining profits as dividends. 37 Note, how-
ever, that the legal duty can arise only when undistributed
profits remain after the reservation of working capital. It
would seem then that if the working capital reservation
w Cannon v. Wiscasset Mills, supra, note 26.
n Ibid. Dictum in Steele v. Locke Cotton Mills Co., 231 N.C. 636, 58
S.E.2d 620 (1950) expresses this view: "Where accumulated profits of a
corporation have been ascertained in conformity with the statute, a
legal duty devolves upon the directors to declare a dividend among the
shareholders of the whole of the accumulated profits and to pay same
to shareholders on demand."
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is within the control of the directors, the statute affords
the aggrieved minority stockholder no help. Indeed, it is
even arguable that the common law "good faith" restriction
on the directorial discretion has been lost if the shareholder
is limited to dividends payable out of profits unreserved
for working capital. The North Carolina courts have han-
dled this problem by requiring that the resolution authoriz-
ing the reservation of working capital meet the "good faith"
standard. Hence in Amick v. Cob/e38 where no corporate
action to reserve working capital was taken until after the
suit for declaration of the dividend was commenced, the
court found that there was sufficient evidence of bad faith
to render the belated attempt of reservation of working
capital invalid, thereby making the accumulated profits
available for dividends. The court gave outward recogni-
tion to this approach in the recent case of Gaines v. Long
Manufacturing Company89 where the court recognized that
while the controlling authorities of a corporation are clothed
with broad discretionary powers in fixing the amount of
working capital, this discretion is not an unlimited one but
must be exercised in good faith. Thus, it seems that the
statute as construed by the North Carolina court effects
little change in the good faith requirement at common law;
for the same proof which establishes the bad faith of the
refusal to declare the dividend at common law, will suffice
to establish the bad faith of the resolution to reserve work-
ing capital under the statute. Admittedly, the statute aids
the stockholder in forcing the dividend when the profits in
question are not earmarked for working capital; but it is
submitted that, as a practical matter, the cases in which
relief is available under the statute and would not be at
common law are few indeed,
CONCLUSION
It has been seen that the courts have been hesitant to
interfere with the corporate dividend policy. This is, per-
haps, as it should be, for the courts are ill equipped to
222 N.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 854 (1943).
13 Gaines v. Long Manufacturing Co., 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 355(1951).
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substitute their judgment for that of those who are closest
to the problem. There is much to be said, however, for
the position that under the present approach, the minority
stockholder is burdened with an excessively heavy legal
handicap in establishing the bad faith of the directors' re-
fusal to declare dividends. There seems to be no ready rem-
edy to the problem; but it is submitted that a possible solu-
tion lies in a change in the present law regarding presump-
tions and burdens of proof. While the present law attaches
to the directorial decision a presumption of good faith,40
thereby shifting the burden of going forward to the share-
holder, it would not seem out of reason to allow the plain-
tiff shareholder the benefit of a presumption of bad faith,
once he has established the existence of profits from which
dividends could be declared and has introduced evidence
tending to show an adverse interest on the part of the
directors. Such a change is not a complete reversal of the
present law, for the shareholder would bear the burden
of proving the availability of profits and the existence of
the adverse interest. But it would serve to attach to these
factors a presumption of bad faith thereby shifting the
burden of justification to the directors, who seem in a
much better position to bear it. While this solution raises
problems of its own, it would seem to have advantages
over an approach which casts the bulk of the burden on
the stockholder who is seldom in command of facts which
enable him to bear it. The directors, on the other hand,
should have little difficulty in defending their refusal to
declare dividends if it is grounded in a reasonably sound
business policy.
10 Wilson v. American Ice Co., 206 F. 736 (D.N.J. 1913); Mulcahy v.
Hibernia Savings and Loan Society, 144 Cal.287, 77 Pac. 910 (1904).
